[Book Notes] Rapid Transit in New York City (1905)
Why read old books // Bibliography // Notes from the book
This essay contains my preliminary book notes for Rapid Transit in New York City, which was published in 1905 after the completion of NYC’s first subway in 1904. They’re not cleaned up the way an essay would be, but I’m publishing them for three reasons: (1) I want to link back to this document in future posts, (2) I want to open my research process a bit more for anyone who might be interested, and (3) I’m sure the notes will prove useful to someone, especially if that someone uses LLMs:
From How tenure should be granted, circa 2024:
Not just on the basis of what you publish, but on what you contribute to the major AI models. So if you go to a major archive and, in some manner, turn it into AI-readable form, that should count for a good deal. It is no worse than publishing a significant article, though of course depending on the quality of the archive.
What is the context of this book? It was published by the Chamber of Commerce, which was merged into the Partnership for New York in 2002. The Chamber was instrumental in getting the subway’s enabling legislation passed at the state level—the Rapid Transit Act of 1894 and subsequent amendments. This book is that institution’s account of how the first subway, built between 1900 and 1904, came to be, including relevant legal and commercial history going back to the seventeenth century.
Why read old books? You get a contemporaneous account of events, which are fundamentally different from modern retellings. As far as Rapid Transit in New York City is concerned, the first branch of the subway only opened last year. Many other lines are now under construction. WW1 hasn’t happened yet. New York City’s consolidation was only seven years ago. New York State’s constitution was just fundamentally rewritten about ten years ago in 1894. What does it feel like to live in such circumstances of change? People often make claims about what people in the past did or did not know—if you read old books, you can see for yourself.
Why reading this book can be difficult: The book takes knowledge of these events for granted, and often omits context that could be helpful to a modern reader who might be less familiar with the legal history of New York City and State at the turn of the twentieth century. While the average transit enthusiast could likely glean quite a lot from the book, they would miss a lot too. The text would also feel confusing and opaque at many points.
What is the nature of my notes? For some books, my notes primarily consist of excerpts I find relevant that I want to use later—that is the case with this book. While I also include my own summaries and thoughts throughout, most of the notes are quotes. You’ll also see that notes from chapters 18-22 are thin, if they exist at all. I didn’t pull anything from those chapters that fit my purposes in reading the book. I hope you enjoy these notes; if you’re reading this on a laptop, Substack also provides a table of contents on the left side of the screen to help you navigate the document.
Bibliography: All parenthetical page citations are from Rapid Transit in New York City and Other Great Cities, New York Chamber of Commerce, 1905.
Other sources that I occasionally pull in via footnote:
Morris, John E., Subway: The Curiosities, Secrets, and Unofficial History of the New York City Transit System (2020).
The Elevated Railroad Cases: Private Property and Mass Transit in Gilded Age New York in the NYU Annual Survey of American Law (April 2006).
In re Rapid Transit Commissioners, 147 N.Y. 260, 41 N.E. 575 (N.Y. 1895).
GILCHRIST et al. v. INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT CO. et al. (SCOTUS, 1929).
Chapter 1: The Beginnings and the Growth of New York City
Henry Hundson (English) was engaged by the Muscovy Company of England to try to find the northwest passage twice, before the Dutch East India Company engaged him to sail a third time in 1609. His ship was called the Half-Moon, and 2-3 years after he returned from the voyage Dutch merchants had settled at the tip of Manhattan. (1-2)
Discussion of the Erie Canal (1817-1825, from Albany to the Niagara River near Buffalo): “...a design which must evidently extend the commerce of this city with exceeding rapidity beyond what it can possibly arrive at by other means; a design which Providence has manifestly pointed out, and which, in the hands of a commercial people, must evidently tend to make them great and powerful; and which, though indefinite in its advantages, may be effected for a sum perfectly trifling when compared with the advantages.” (2-3)
Note Mayor Abram Hewitt’s 1888 speech to the Board of Alderman. Release this as a post.
Notes on De Witt Clinton, mayor and governor, who undertook the Erie Canal, which was not widely accepted or thought prudent. “Clinton started to dig his ‘ditch’...amid much ridicule. But the undertaking, stupendous as it was, was pushed to completion in October, 1825.” (3)
Not fear of apartments, but curiosity: “A factor which should not be overlooked in the study of a problem of this nature [rapid transit] is ‘the flat,’ which has done for certain residential districts what the skeleton-framed skyscraper later did for the commercial and financial district—increased the capacity of the ground area. One of these ‘Parisian novelties’ had been built in 1865, and in 1870-71 two large apartment houses were erected on Eighteenth and Thirteenth streets. From this initiative the style spread, and has had much to do with increasing the density of population.” (4-5)
Chapter 2: Plans for Relief
Steam vessels to cross the rivers sprang up in the 1820s and spread from there. (6)
Grand Central Station of today (1903-1913) was preceded by two other stations named the same way, which date to 1871.
Elevated railroads from 1870s-1890s
Brooklyn Bridge (1869-1883)
Cable cars in 1884, which were displaced by electric systems later.
Status quo bias: “It may be that ten years ago, or even five years ago, many people in New York believed that existing systems were the best that could be devised; that the electric cars on the surface and the elevated trains were entirely satisfactory; and that nothing remained but to extend accommodations as population increased. They had become used to the trouble of climbing to stations well lifted above the streets. They had forgotten about the dangers of ‘roads upon stilts.’ They ignored the discomfort to dwellers along the lines. They recognized how unsightly the structures were, but sank regrets in view of their utility. They equally minimized the objections that may be raised against the use of streets by a surface system that is noisy to a degree, that greatly inconveniences ordinary traffic, and that in each and every year maims and kills many victims…The ultimate goal is a system, or systems, that will be not unsightly, that will be noiseless to a reasonable degree, that will not cause undue inconvenience to any persons or interests, that will be safe for passengers and not dangerous to others, and that will be rapid. This is the goal; and in view of progress heretofore made, and in view of progress at large, one may say with confidence that it will be reached.” (7-8)
Chapter 3: Early Subway Schemes
Timeline from 1868-1900 (9)
1868: New York City Central Underground Railway Company incorporated via Legislature, to run from City Hall to the Harlem River. “No practical result was reached.”
1868: The Beach Pneumatic Transit Company
1872: New York City Rapid Transit Company was incorporated with Cornelius Vanderbilt and others, via Legislature, to run an underground line from City Hall to connect with New York & Harlem Railroad and with the New York Central (Vanderbilt’s). “Adverse criticisms made at the time led Commodore Vanderbilt to decide that he would not construct the road.” (9)
1881: The Central Tunnel Railway Company
1883: The New York & New Jersey Tunnel Railway Company
1886: The Terminal Underground Railway Company
1896: The Underground Railroad Company of the City of New York (a consolidation of two companies)
1897: The Rapid Transit Underground Railroad Company
Regarding Beach—legislation has long considered externalities: “As amended in 1873 [the charter] the company permitted [to build an underground railway.]...The act stated that the water and gas pipes and sewers must be maintained, and that street travel must not be interrupted during construction.”
Private capital was too nervous to build: “But all of the work done failed of successful issue. Engineers of prominence were divided in their opinion as to the possibility of building an underground road through narrow streets lined with heavy buildings. Even in the seventies the Beach plans were condemned because it was thought that the tube could not be constructed under the street in front of such a massive structure as the Astor House.1 Since the methods were not endorsed by engineers, financial interests were chary about investing money in it. Many believed that if built the returns would be insufficient to pay operating expenses and interest on the invested capital. The capitalists and engineers of those days should not be too hastily condemned as shortsighted. The needs of the people of our city for rapid transit increased greatly in the next thirty years; the population increased greatly; the city’s wealth increased, and notable advances were made in the science of tunnel construction and of the movement of trains. A revolution was effected in the matter last named by the introduction of electric traction. We would have had no subway to this time if private enterprise had been relied upon.” (11)
Chapter 4: Bridges to Brooklyn (section: The Brooklyn Bridge (1869-1883))
1829: “A proposition to build a chain suspension bridge over the East River, with a clear span of 1,500 feet and a length of 2,100 feet between the ‘toll gates,’ was proposed as early as 1829.” John A. Roebling appointed chief engineer. (13)
1867: “...the Legislature passed an act incorporating the New York Bridge Company.”
1869: “A survey of the line was made in the summer of 1869, and the Brooklyn tower located. It was while engaged in this work that Mr. Roebling met with an accident that resulted in his death. In the same year his son, Washington A. Roebling, was appointed to the position formerly occupied by his father, and under his supervision the work was carried to completion in May 1883.” (13)
Note on death: so many important people just died from regular things! Calvin Coolidge’s son, John A. Roebling, the Tweed Comptroller, Pierre Curie, AHG!
1874: “an act was passed changing the name to that of the New York and Brooklyn Bridge, and making it a public work to be constructed by the two cities, Brooklyn paying two-thirds of the cost and New York one-third.” (14)
Technology was quickly advancing in this time, and engineers had to respond, especially cable traction and then the third rail system. In order to accommodate these changes and connections to the elevated railroads, “All these changes made necessary the complete re-designing and re-construction of the Brooklyn approaches, and also the changing of the station at the western end.” (18) They reworked things as necessary, and on the fly, according to evolving technology. They seemed to need to do it faster than we do now?
Allegations of corruption, responded to by Abram Hewitt: “During the period occupied by its erection New York was in the clutches of the Tweed ring, an audacious and unscrupulous gang of thieves. Yet, when the accounts were finally audited, every dollar of the appropriations was found to have been expended in wages or material, and its actual face value was represented in the completed structure. The ring had proposed otherwise and the belief was general that the bridge treasury had been looted. Mayor William C. Havemeyer appointed a committee to investigate the matter. Abram S. Hewitt was a member of that committee. In speaking of the results of this inquiry, Mr. Hewitt said: ‘The duty was performed without fear or favor…The bridge has not only been honestly built, but it may be safely asserted that it could not now be duplicated at the same cost. Much money might, however, have been saved if the work had not been delayed through lack of means and unnecessary obstacles interposed by mistaken public officials. Measured by its capacity and the limitations imposed on its construction by its relation to the interests of traffic and navigation, it is the cheapest structure ever erected by the genius of man.’”2 (18-19)
Importance of the bridge to transit, consolidation, inspiration: “We have extended our notes on the Brooklyn Bridge to considerable length because of its vast importance in providing easy transit between section of the city that were separate by a natural barrier, because it was the first municipal undertaking on the line of rapid transit, and because the bridge is beautiful to a degree as well as useful…It is a notable monument to the genius of the engineers who planned it and to the public spirit of those citizens who, with untiring zeal in the face of great obstacles, so worked that it was carried to completion. It typified union between nearby centers of unrelated population. It has led to the conception of that political union which has made New York the second city on the globe.
Chapter 5: Tunnels
Hudson River Tunnels (excellent story, great personalities/lore) (1874-1908, finished eventually by William Gibbs McAdoo!)
“From time to time proposals were advanced to build a bridge over the river. To this moment no individual or interest has made progress in that direction.” (27) lol
“In 1871 an individual [Dewitt Clinton Haskin, D.C. Haskin] who was neither a citizen of New York nor connected with the business of New York; who was not even an engineer, although he had been concerned in railroad construction, conceived the idea of making a tunnel under the river.” (27)
“So while the work of sinking the piers for the Brooklyn bridge was underway…[he declared] to his friends that tunnels, not bridges, were practical, and that in the long run the world would so decide. And so convinced was he of the merit of his proposed enterprise that he would not seek state or municipal aid, or the aid of the great railroads centering in Jersey City, but would do it all himself, out of his own means and the means of friends who might have faith in the enormous values he proposed to create. It is almost unnecessary to say that he died in proverty (sic). He was blind in his latter days, yet his courage never failed. To the end he believed that he had pointed the way, shown others how a great work should be done, and that he would be called a great benefactor long after his critics were forgotten.”3
“On the morning of July 21, 1880, a blow-out occurred at this point, the air escaping up along the side of the shaft. The falling earth and plates so wedged the inner lock door that it could not be opened to allow the men to escape and 20 were drowned. At the inquest that followed, the engineers employed upon the tunnel were vastly relieved when Mr. Haskin stated that he, and he alone, was responsible for the plans and for their execution.” (31)
“An idea of how this job was viewed by the technical press may be formed by the following extract, which was published after the tunnels had been carried forward some distance: ‘...It has become unsafe to pronounce an unfavorable opinion in regard to any particular piece of work connected with the tunnel. In more than one instance obstacles which seemed to present an insurmountable barrier to all future progress have been met and conquered, and the work has gone forward. New devices and plans have kept pace with new difficulties.” (32-33)
“...as a specimen of what can be accomplished under the most discouraging surroundings it [D.W. Haskin’s tunnel] deserves record.”
The mayor, governor, and legislature moved quickly to amend law as needed: Witness the 1902 charter amendment that allowed the grant of a perpetual franchise to the Pennsylvania Railroad, to be periodically reviewed. (41-43)
Chapter 6: Elevated Railroads
“Dealing with the subject in January, 1874, the Railroad Gazette said: ‘The number of people in New York who think they know how to build a rapid transit railroad is, we believe quite as large as those who are sure they could edit a newspaper or keep a hotel. It is amusing to hear some of these assert, in the most dogmatic way, principles about which the most experienced engineer would hesitate to give an opinion. The whole subject has been up for discussion twenty years or more, and makes its appearance annually in the State Legislature. No systematic effort, so far as we know, has thus far been made to collect accurate information, and the public mind is in a state of chaos regarding the whole subject.” (44)
This chapter provides a general overview of the various elevated railroads that were proposed, chartered, and attempted, and built in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It ends with the dawning of the subway era: “On January 1, 1903, the Interborough Rapid Transit Company leased the Manhattan Railway Company for 999 years, beginning April 1, 1903…At the present time, therefore, the Interborough Rapid Transit Company controls the entire elevated system, as well as the underground roads now finished.” (49)
This report gives extended excerpts of actual law. For example, see 1867 enabling statute for an experimental rail line. (45)
Chapter 7: Rapid Transit Commission of 1875
“A law enacted in 1875 authorized the Mayor of New York City to appoint a Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners to decide whether the city actually needed rapid transit, to select the route or routes, and, if found expedient, to organize a company to build the lines.” Two companies were given franchises to build lines from the Battery to the Harlem River via third avenue, and the other from the Battery to Harlem via second avenue. Both of these lines were acquired by Gould’s Manhattan Railway Company in 1879. (51-52)
“Although tunnel projects were at that time very numerous, the Commission did not at any time seriously consider the subway question as in any way likely to meet the demands for better transit accommodations. The engineering difficulties and the financial uncertainties involved were held to bar such projects.” (52) Ironically, the same sentiments exist today.
Chapter 8: Commission of 1891
Summary of this commission: it studied routes for an underground railroad, put them out to bid, but only received one bid of $1,000. The existing elevated lines (especially J. Gould’s Manhattan Railway Company) at the time either did not bid, or submitted unsatisfactory bids on wildly unfavorable terms. This commission produced great engineering work that laid the groundwork for the subway—one of its engineers was William Barclay Parsons, the chief engineer of the 1894 commission who oversaw the IRT construction—but it resigned, having built nothing. (52-60)
Principal four requirements of the Act of 1891: “The commissioners were required, if, after investigation, they deemed the construction of a rapid transit railroad necessary, first, to adopt the routes and general plan of construction for such railroad; second, to obtain the consent to the construction and operation of such railroad by the local authorities and the property holders affected, or, if the consent of the property holders should be withheld, then the consent of the General Term of the Supreme Court; third, to adopt detailed plans for the construction and operations of such road; and, lastly, to sell the right to construct and operate such railroad to a corporation to be formed under the terms of the [Rapid Transit Act of 1891], for such a period of time as they should deem advisable and upon such terms as they should be able to exact.” (54)
“The plans were approved by the Board of Alderman, the Department of Public Parks, and by the Commissioner of Street Improvements of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Wards, as required by the terms of the Act. All the necessary consents were obtained, including a majority of the property owners along Broadway. But, after all this had been accomplished, it was found that capitalists could ot be induced to invest in the enterprise. The undertaking was upon such a vast scale, and the prospective revenue so doubtful, that hopes of carrying the scheme to completion were hardly entertained at all.” (56)
“In the fall of 1892 the Commission advertised for bids for the franchise, and on December 30 met in City Hall. But one bid was received, that of $1,000 from William N. Amory.” (56)
“The Commission was engaged upon that work when the present Commission, created by the Act of 1894, came into existence. On May 24, 1894, the Commission voted to pass its records, property, etc., over to its successor. Not all of the achievements of the Commission of 1891 were of a negative kind. The studies made by the engineering staff under the direction of William Barclay Parsons were of the greatest value to the next Board.” (60)
Chapter 9: The Chamber of Commerce
Summary of the Chamber of Commerce’s involvement with the subway: The Chamber helped write and pass the Rapid Transit Act of 1894, which appointed a transit commission independent of city politics,4 and allowed the city to issue bonds to help fund the subway on behalf of a private franchisee, who would finance the construction and rolling stock directly. This was the deal that ultimately resulted in the first subway.
“‘For reasons that need not be stated in this report, your committee cannot advocate the building of any system of rapid transit by the city of New York; but, under certain safeguards to be provided by legislation, it urges upon the Chamber the propriety of recommending that a single exception be made to the admirable law which restricts municipal credit being lent to promote private enterprises.’” (62)
The Chamber debated which of the three options for subway construction were best: wholly completed by the city; wholly completed by private capital (the 1891 plan); or a blended version of the two where the city owned the railroad, but its construction and operation were franchised to a private corporation. In the end they endorsed the third option, and baked that into the rapid transit act of 1894: “Conceding, then, that we must have a new system, and that it must be an underground system, the question comes as to how its construction can be secured. There are only three methods: either by private capital, or by an association of private capital with the city, or by the city itself. Those are the three alternatives.” (70)
Abram Hewitt did not want the city to run or construct the subway (although he was in favor of city ownership): “It has been objected to .the undertaking of this work by the city and on account of the city that there would be scandals involved in the expenditure of this large amount of money by the city authorities, and that the administration of such a work by the city authorities after it was constructed would result in an intolerable abuse, and would practically turn over the city of New York to the politicians and their followers. This objection would be an absolutely conclusive one in my mind, and I suppose to the mind of everybody else, if it were necessary that either the construction or administration of the work should reside in the hands of city officials. There is no such necessity.” (71)
“...that the danger and abuse that might come from the construction of the work by city officials and the operation of the railway afterwards by public officers, could be avoided by the simple process of making a lease to a responsible corporation who would have the expenditure of the money in construction, under the supervision of city officers, and who would be sure to make it as light as possible, because they would have to pay interest on every dollar that was expended.” (68)
Abram Hewitt compared the subway to the Erie Canal and the Croton Aqueduct, and the Brooklyn Bridge:
[Erie Canal] “When the State of New York was confronted by a greater problem than this, the greatest that has ever presented itself to a civilized community on this side of the Atlantic—the construction of the Erie Canal, upon which has been built up the superstructure of the whole state, its prosperity, commercial, agricultural and otherwise—the state took it in hand; became the owner, borrowed the money, paid for the work, and, perhaps unfortunately, retained the administration of the property after it was constructed.” (66)
[Croton Aqueduct] “The city of New York has pursued the same system. The Croton Aqueduct was constructed by the public, at its own cost, and administered by its own officers.” (66)
Regarding the Brooklyn Bridge: the private corporation chartered to complete it went bankrupt and the city of New York and Brooklyn bought out the private shareholders and became the owners of the project outright. (66-67)
“I am free to say that I should hold the same opinion that I did when we went before the Board of Alderman and advocated the building of our rapid transit system by the city, provided we had men at the helm of our municipal affairs that we could trust; but as that is not now the case, nor is there any prospect that we soon shall have, I could not and I would not, as a member of this committee, put myself on record as advising the Chamber to recommend that the city should build this much needed system of rapid transit…to be controlled by the power which controls the municipal government of the city of New York.” (73)
The rapid transit act of 1894, as driven forward by the Chamber, passed. It authorized the city to issue municipal bonds of no more than $50 million to finance the construction of the subways by private franchisees. “The road itself, upon being constructed, immediately becomes the property of the city for which it is constructed. The rolling stock and other equipment of the road is to be the property of the contractor, provided by him at his own expense.” (74)
“...the Chamber of Commerce took up the discussion of rapid transit problems at its meeting on February 1, 1894…the bill so prepared [by the Chamber] passed the Legislature and was signed by the Governor May 22, 1894…The Chamber of Commerce worked two months upon problems that had engaged earnest attention for a quarter of a century. It found the correct solution. That it did so was due to the clear judgment of Mr. Hewitt, a man singularly well equipped both as a successful merchant and trained in the affairs of state.” (76) Lesson here: it’s possible to move fast, particularly if you have previous work to build upon. This was also true of the 1989 charter revision commission, which was preceded by another revision commission in the same way the rapid transit commission was.
Chapter 10: Abram S. Hewitt
This chapter honors Mayor Hewitt and his contributions toward making the subway a reality. “On the 5th of April, 1900, the Chamber of Commerce held a meeting at which Alexander E. Orr, President of the Rapid Transit Commission, reported the signing of the contract for the construction of the subway…At the meeting the following resolutions were adopted: Resolved, That a gold medal be struck in recognition of the eminent services of the Hon. Abram S. Hewitt in the cause of civic rapid transit under municipal ownership…” (77)
The rest of the chapter is excerpts from a speech delivered by Abram Hewitt
“Inasmuch as it would not be safe for the city to undertake the construction itself, the intervention of a contracting company appeared to be indispensable.” (80)
“One thing is certain: that the rapid transit system adopted by the Commission will be fully completed and put in operation without involving any additional taxation whatever, and at the end of fifty years it will be the absolutely unencumbered property of the city. Compared with other enterprises in other cities, it must be conceded that the arrangement made for the construction of this work is the most favorable that has ever been devised or accomplished.” (82)
Chapter 11: Commission of 1894
Requirements of the Act: “The Act of 1894 was signed by Governor Flower on May 22, of that year…and provided that [the rapid transit commission] should be composed of the Mayor, Comptroller and the President of the Chamber of Commerce, and of [five named members of the Chamber of Commerce].”...it provided that the Board should either adopt the plans prepared by the preceding Board, or adopt new plans and obtain the consent of the Supreme Court. It required that, after either re-adopting the old plans or making new ones and obtaining the consents, the Board at the next general election should submit to the qualified electors of the city ‘the question whether such railway or railways shall be constructed by the city and at the public expense.’” And if not, it would be given wholly to private capital to construct, per 1891. (84)
Amendments to the Act: “The amended statute was passed in 1895. It provided that the city should extinguish all easements of abutting property holders that might be affected by the construction of the road, thus guaranteeing the contractor against the class of litigation which had proved so serious to the elevated railroads,5 and authorized the city to expend the addition sum of $5,000,000 for that purpose”
Referendum on a city-owned subway system:“The result of the election showed an overwhelming majority in favor of municipal construction.” (87)
State court cases that influenced the subway (and delayed its implementation):
General Term can’t hear the case: Under the Rapid Transit Act of 1891 and 1894, the Rapid Transit Commission had to get the permission of a majority of property holders on any route to build it; failing that, they could apply to the General Term of the Supreme Court, which would appoint a commission of three people to make a recommendation on the matter, and then the court would rule as to route acceptability. In 1895, the Rapid Transit Commission applied to the Court for a route along Broadway, and the court refused to hear the case on the grounds that it was scheduled to be abolished by the Constitutional Convention of 1894, which effectively converted the General Term into the Appellate Division beginning January 1, 1896. This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, and the Court of Appeals said the General Term was required to hear the case. The court appointed a commission, which completed its report in March 1896 (at which point the General Term had become the Appellate Division).6 “Two months later the matter was argued before the Supreme Court, which unanimously refused to confirm the report of its Commissioners, because it contended: (1) the final system wouldn’t be true rapid transit, (2) the subway couldn’t be built with the money in hand, and (3) the expense would take the city so close to its debt limit that it couldn’t finance other projects.
Act of 1894 unconstitutional: “Action was brought in the Supreme Court for the purpose of enjoining the city from using its funds for the construction of the road, upon the ground that the Act of 1894 was unconstitutional in many of its features, and therefore afforded no legal warrant for the proposed expenditure. This action was carried to the Court of Appeals and there decided in favor of the city.” (91)
Elevated lines drag their feet to extend Commission’s work (death by delay): “Following closely upon the announcement of the fact that the Rapid Transit Board would continue its efforts to secure the construction of a rapid transit railroad for and at the expense of the city, came an application from the Manhattan Railway Company that the Board would authorize it to build elevated railroads over a number of additional streets. This application was vague and indefinite in some respects, and, in still others, it sought privileges which the Board had no power to grant. A communication was sent to the railroad company on August 6, 1896…after the lapse of eighteen months, it had become evident that the rapid transit railroad was likely to be constructed by the city.” (92) “The Manhattan Company refused to accept any of the franchises. It was unwilling to undertake the work of extending its traffic facilities. Its last opportunity had come and gone. It was controlled apparently by a belief that no solution of rapid transit problems could be obtained without its co-operation…A procrastinating policy had been successful with former commissions, and why should it not be in this case?”7 (104)
Some people gave consent and wanted a line: “As soon as the intention of the Board became known there ensued an agitation among the property owners along lower Broadway in favor of the extension of the road to the Battery. In a few weeks a petition was presented to the Board, signed by a majority, in value, of all the property owners, asking for the extension of the road.” (99)
The Supreme Court heard another case to build the line, lacking majority property owner consent, in 1897. They imposed a bond of $15,000,000 on city/subway contractors to complete the work. This imposed a substantial cost. This bond was later reduced to reasonable levels. (99-103, see 112 for final reduction)
Consolidation in 1898 pooled the debts of all municipalities: “...with the result that the debt incurring capacity of the new city was reduced to a very narrow limit. But this proved to be only temporary, since the increase in the assessed valuations of property in the county of New York, which was shortly made in order to equalize its value with the assessed valuations in other portions of the city, resulted in giving such a margin as would suffice for the construction of the rapid transit railroad without intrenching upon the ten per cent. Limitation imposed by the charter.” (99-100)
Consolidation brought outer-borough NIMBYs: “Another result of the consolidation was a tendency to array the influence of Kings and Richmond counties, and a portion of Queens, against the plans. At that time it seemed that the endeavors of the Board would be defeated or at least doomed to indefinite postponement.” (100)
Chapter 12: Preparing the Subway Contract
City authorities dragged their feet in approving the subway contract: “In a communication to Mayor Robert A. VanWyck, under date of May 19, 1899, the Commissioners said: ‘The Board begs to repeat that its power to carry out the purpose for which it was created now depends practically, first, upon the permission of the Corporation Counsel to make any contract, and, second, upon the assent of the Board of Estimate to a postponement of the making of other contracts involving large municipal debt until a rapid transit contract, actually made, shall assure the carrying out of that great public measure. The Board, therefore, respectfully asks your Honor, and through you the other municipal authorities, whether in these two respects it may be aided to secure prompt and actual construction of the rapid transit road by the city.”
“No answer was received from the Mayor, nor was any action taken by either the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the Corporation Counsel. The subject was again gone over in a communication to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment in July…No answer was received to this communication. It was not until September 20, 1899, eighteen months later, that a letter was received by the Rapid Transit Commision from the Corporation Counsel. He withheld approval of the draft contract ‘for the reason that, while the approval of the Corporation Counsel was technically merely an approval as to form, it has always been the practice of this Department in such a case not to approve as to form a contract which could not legally be made. He stated that the city was now in a position to undertake the work, and suggested changes in the form. A revised draft of the contract was approved by the Corporation Counsel October 11, 1899.” (111)Beauty a consideration in the first subway contract: “All the exposed parts of the structure are to be designed, constructed and maintained with a view to the beauty of their appearance as well as to their efficiency…” (112)
Do we fulfill the terms of the original contract today? “The waiting rooms are to be kept clean and comfortable; proper seating capacity is to be provided and good drinking water, as also sufficient and suitable water closets, which are to be kept in a thoroughly sanitary condition.” (115)
Five cent fare: “The contractor is to charge for a single fare not more than 5 cents.”8
In May 1899, William Barclay Parsons was selected as chief engineer of the Commission.
“The foregoing fails to convey even a faint conception of the discouraging delays that continually beset all efforts of the Rapid Transit Commission to accomplish the object for which it was created. No sooner was one obstacle surmounted than another, perhaps more formidable, was presented. This constant changing of the aspect of the question made necessary repeated revisions and alterations of the plans, all of which took time. Although there was an imperative demand for rapid transit by the people, who had by a large majority of their votes sanctioned municipal ownership, the city authorities and the courts were indisposed to promote the purpose.” (116)
Chapter 13: Contract Awarded and Work Begun
John McDonald awarded contract: “The legal and financial difficulties which had so long prevented active steps having been overcome during the fall of 1899, the Board decided, in November of that year, to advertise the contract as provided by law…At noon on January 15, 1900, two bids were opened in the office of the Board, in the presence of all the Commissioners.” John B. McDonald, of New York, was selected as contractor; “...the contract for the whole line was signed and executed Friday 21, 1900) (118-119)
McDonald didn’t have enough money, and was required to put up $7 million in cash and bonds to get started ($1M continuing bond for payment of rent, etc; $1M securities to deposit with comptroller, to eventually substitute for a bond; $5M construction bond). So he brought in capitalist August Belmont for financing. (119)
“On March 24, 1900, the work of construction of the Rapid Transit Railroad was formally begun in front of the City Hall.” (120)
“The Interborough Rapid Transit Company, the operating company, was formed in the spring of 1902…In January 1903, this company acquired the elevated railway system from the Manhattan Company by lease for 999 years.” (120)
Chapter 14: Engineering Features of the New York Subway
Sewers: “...a complete reconstruction of the [sewer] system was necessary, involving the building of 7.21 miles of sewers along the route of the railway, and 5.13 miles of sewers in streets other than that followed by the route.” (27)
Pipe galleries!
“Almost all of the sewer and pipe work was preliminary to the building of the subway. The reconstruction was accomplished without interrupting the flow of any house connection, catch basin, or other sewer.” (127)
Suppring Columbus Monument (131)
“Design of Stations” (138-139): “At appropriate stations suggestive designs have been worked into the walls. Thus there is the “Caravel” at Columbus Circle; the “Beaver” at Astor place, and the Arms of Columbia University at the Columbia University station. (139)
Chapter 15: Equipment of the Subway
Power House: “The power house occupies the site bounded by Fifty-eight and Fifty-ninth streets and Eleventh and Twelfth avenues.” (140)
“Lack of space will not permit an extended description of the many admirable features of the equipment of the subway provided by the Interborough Company. As it stands today it represents not only the best practice in electrical generation and distribution, but in many characteristics it is far in advance.” (151)
Chapter 16: Work of Commission During Construction of Subway
“The original Act of 1894 was passed before the consolidation, and provided for the construction of a rapid transit railroad only within the city of New York. It was therefore doubtful whether the Board had power to establish a route and general plan for the construction, at the expense of the city, of roads extending into boroughs other than Manhattan and the Bronx. In order to resolve this question, a bill was introduced in the Legislature to extend the powers of the Rapid Transit Commission into all parts of Greater New York. This became a law April 23, 1900.” (152)
“One of the most important achievements of the Commission during the year 1902 was a change effected in the Rapid Transit Act, Section 32. This amendment was made necessary by the application of the Pennsylvania Railroad…for the right to construct a railroad beneath the Hudson River, Borough of Manhattan, the East River and a portion of the Borough of Queens, with a large terminal station to be located in the Borough of Manhattan. The original Act made no provision for the granting of franchises to existing railroads desirous of entering the city.” (154)
“Of still more importance than the granting of these franchises was the work done toward the general scheme, for the future of municipal and other rapid transit for the Boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx and Queens…The routes and general plan of the Brooklyn-Manhattan extension were taken up in 1900 immediately after the contract had been awarded for the Manhattan-Bronx railroad. They were approved by the Board January 24, 1901; by the Board of Alderman May 21, and by the Mayor on June 1 of the same year. As the consent of a sufficient number of abutting property owners could not be secured, application for approval was made to the Supreme Court. The report of the commissioners appointed by the court was confirmed January 17, 1902.” (154-155)
Labor rights in contract 2: “The contract contained the eight-hour provision with respect to laborers, workmen, and mechanics.” (156)
“After ten years of hard, incessant toil the Board was now to see the completion of the first portion of its task.” (161)
Chapter 17: Opening the Subway
“The ceremonies incident to the opening of the Subway took place in the City Hall, October 27, 1904.” (162)
Remarks of Mayor McClellan:
“Without rapid transit Greater New York would be little more than a geographical expression. It is no exaggeration to say that without interborough communication Greater New York would never have come into being.”
“When the Brooklyn Bridge was opened Greater New York was born. Every addition to transit facilities has added to her growth, which can only reach its full development when a complete system of rapid transit shall be rapid in fact as well as in name…”
Chief Engineer Parsons: “Chief Engineer Parsons, upon being introduced by the Mayor, said: ‘I have the honor and very great pleasure to report that the rapid transit railroad is completed for operation from the City Hall station to the station at One-hundred-and-forty-fifth street, on the west side.’”
Remarks of Board Chairman Orr:
“In each of the civilized countries of later years there is only one great metropolitan city, largely the result of improved methods of national transportation, and all roads lead up to it in which are centered the culture, the refinements, and the wealth of the nation. Just as London is the metropolis of Great Britain and Paris of France, so is New York the metropolis of the United States. I know we have many large and growing cities, but if we are true to ourselves and do not overlook or recklessly cast aside our opportunities, this country of ours, great as it is, can only have one New York.” (163-164)
“Viewed from the standpoint of to-day, it is a singular fact that only a little more than four years ago subway construction under municipal ownership was regarded with suspicion and distrust by those largely identified with local and national passenger transport, and, as far as I have been able to discover, with the single notable exception referred to above, by the prominent financiers of that period. If it had rested with the men controlling these great interests, I think I am justified in saying that municipal rapid transit would yet remain an unsolved problem.”
“It is, therefore, with a feeling somewhat akin to gratitude that the Commission makes record of the fact that on January 15, 1900, John B. McDonald, neither a railroad man nor a financier, but a contractor identified with large undertakings, after making a careful study of the situation, had the courage of his convictions and made an acceptable tender for the franchise contract…” (167)
Remarks of John H. Starin (commissioner):
“Since the signing of the first contract in 1900, a great revolution in public opinion has taken place regarding city travel. My mind goes back to the time when the Commission of 1891 first came to the conclusion that underground rapid transit was the only cure for the ills that traveling New Yorkers were heirs to. In those days the number of persons who believed in an underground construction was most limited; indeed, it might have been comprised in a list made up of the Commissioners themselves, their engineers and assistants, and a few who had given the matter some study. Even among those who in the few subsequent years came to believe that such a plan was feasible and desirable, there were few sanguine enough to expect its construction; and to come down to 1900, even after the contract was signed, many could be found who said they did not expect to live to ride on such a road.” (170)
“But, in the midst of that rejoicing, let us not forget the men who fought the battle and won the victory. Let us remember McDonald the contractor, and Belmont the capitalist, and William Barclay Parsons the engineer, and above all and beyond all let us remember Alexander E. Orr, the president of the Rapid Transit Commission.” (170)
Remarks of August Belmont:
“If any especial credit is due to my associates and myself, it is that the financial end committed to our care required the exercise of a kind of courage not frequently demanded for an investment. It was a new and untried venture…With all this I am entitled to add, I think, and I add it with no inconsiderable pride, the initiation and prosecution of the work have not involved an excessive capitalization. The capital represented by the par of the stock issued, together with the obligations issued by the city, represents substantially the cost of the investment for construction, equipment, and installation of the subway and the railway.” (172)
“At a time when there are so many ill-digested and ill-considered plans under discussion, having for their object not only municipal ownership, but municipal operation of transportation lines, the State of New York has reached the true solution of this problem—that municipal participation is justified to the extent of furnishing credit for the construction of such a work, but should stop short of the operation of the property when constructed.” (173)
Chapter 18: Future Rapid Transit in New York
“The relation of one section to another, and with Manhattan as a center, must be kept in mind.” (175)
“Rapid transit franchises, it is now believed, ought to be granted with reference to a systematic treatment of the subject under the guidance or initiatory control of a single body like this Board, with a tenure sufficiently long to assure not only the adoption of a comprehensive programme, but also, at least in part, its execution.” (175)
“Tremendous increase in passenger travel on all lines during the past year clearly indicates that when the present subway system, no under construction from Brooklyn to the Bronx, is completed, it will almost be immediately congested, so that no great amount of permanent relief can be counted on. In order to meet the growing and imperative demands for increased facilities, arising from the natural growth of our city, it is evident that new lines should be laid down now and put under construction as soon as possible…” (176)
Chapter 19: Financial Statement
Chapter 20: Rapid Transit in Other Cities
Chapter 21: Present Rapid Transit Laws
Excellent overview of all the considerations of rapid transit contracts (bonds, franchises, rights and privileges of all actors, etc).
Chapter 22: Appreciation of the Chamber
To be fair to their suspicions: “A half-built subway tunnel caved in along Park Avenue (then Fourth Avenue) between 37th and 38th Streets in March 1902, undermining the front walls of a row of grand town houses.” (Subway, 19)
“Like many New Yorkers, [land speculator Charles T. Barney] was in favor of the subway so long as it wasn’t built right outside his front door. As it happened, Barney lived in a town house on Fourth Avenue (now Park Avenue) along the path of the first line, and he sued the IRT, seeking a court order to stop the work, arguing that the digging came too close to the foundation of his home. A judge denied his request, but Barney was right. The front of his house was undermined when the ground subsided along the tunnel in 1903. By then he had resigned from the IRT board.” (Subway, 139)
Similar to comments made about the Erie Canal on pages 2-3, which was also plagued with cost overruns that were dwarfed by the project’s benefits: “...and which, though indefinite in its advantages, may be effected for a sum perfectly trifling when compared with the advantages.”
He seems to have been correct! The man who eventually completed the tunnel, William Gibbs McAdoo, wrote this: “[William Gibbs McAdoo] imagined a subway connecting the three main train stations on the New Jersey shorefront to Manhattan. In 1901, the 38-year-old arranged for a tour of the abandoned tunnel and had an epiphany: ‘The Fates had marked a day when I was to go under the riverbed and encounter this piece of dripping darkness, and it would rise from its grave and walk by my side. I was destined to give it color and movement and warmth, but it would change the course of my life and lead me into a new career…As I entered the tunnel, I had a powerful feeling of visiting a place I had known well many years ago…I was like a man who walks through a wrecked and dismantled house that he had lived in when he was a boy.’” (Subway, 97-98)
“A reconstituted Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners, formed in 1891, drew up a plan for a privately financed subway and put it out for bids from contractors. It received just one offer, a $1,000 bid that was not deemed serious. It wasn’t until 1894 that the pieces began to fall into place. That year the city’s Chamber of Commerce allied with Republicans in Albany to form a new board independent of city politicians. Six of the eight commissioners would come from the Chamber itself—the law specified five members by name—and the commissioners were appointed for life with the power to name their successors. They were, in effect, accountable to no one. The bill’s proponents ‘thought responsibility for a subway should be entrusted to a special breed of honest, upright, farsighted men—namely, themselves,’ in the words of historian Clifton Hood.” (Subway, 10)
See The Elevated Railroad Cases: Private Property and Mass Transit in Gilded Age New York in the NYU Annual Survey of American Law (April 2006).
“The financiers behind the street railways and elevated line companies, which were threatened by a subway, didn’t give up without a fight, however. They delayed matters by making vague offers to extend their lines, forcing the Board to postpone a final decision about the subway route. The ‘fine, high-minded, soft-hearted old gentlemen’ on the Board were no match for ‘the impossibly alert young fellows of Wall Street, with their unlimited money, with their control of the political machines, with the best legal brains at their disposal,’ journalist Ray Stannard Baker write in 1905, explaining the years of delay.” (Subway, 11)
This would be repeatedly litigated, especially after the inflation of WW1 and the Great Depression. See, for example: GILCHRIST et al. v. INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT CO. et al. (SCOTUS, 1929).