There are multiple sections to a bill that gets passed into law. Most people expect the actual statute itself—whatever law the bill is changing, adding, or removing. But there is sometimes a “declaration of legislative intent/purpose” or “legislative findings” section where the legislature explains why they are passing the law.
These intent/findings sections are illuminating, and can be used by courts, voters, and elected officials alike to guide future action.1
And as it turns out, New York City and State’s rent regulation laws have legislative intent/findings sections! We can see what the laws themselves have to say about the housing crisis that precipitated them. In this piece, I want to highlight three of those things:
The housing emergency is fundamentally caused by a lack of housing supply.
The housing emergency is specifically caused by a lack of private residential supply.
The goal of rent regulation is to be a bridge back to a primarily market-based rental system.
Some added context: New York City’s rent regulation system has evolved a lot since it first appeared in 1920.2 The thicket of laws is difficult to keep straight, and many are no longer operative, or only partially operative, or have been amended. For the purposes of this essay, I will be examining three laws, all of which hold up New York City’s rent stabilization system today:
“Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act,” New York State Unconsolidated Laws, Chapter 21, Laws of 1962. Action: gives New York City Council the power to declare a rental public emergency.
“The Rent Stabilization Law of 1969,” New York City Administrative Code, Title 26: Housing and Buildings, Chapter 4: Rent Stabilization. Action: creates New York City rent stabilization.
“Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (ETPA),” New York State Unconsolidated Laws, Chapter 576, Laws of 1974. Action: defines a local rental public emergency as a vacancy rate of 5% or below.
Some further context: most modern rent regulation (usually “rent stabilization” specifically) is only in effect when the New York City Council has declared a housing public emergency, pursuant to state law. This emergency can be declared when the city’s vacancy rate is 5% or less.3 New York City has been in a rental public emergency for over 50 years.4
Now let’s look at what the rent regulation laws say about the housing crisis.5
The housing emergency is fundamentally caused by a lack of supply
Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act §2, “Legislative finding”: “The legislature hereby finds…that there continues to exist an acute shortage of
dwellings…”ETPA §2, “Legislative finding”: “…there continues to exist in many areas of the state an acute shortage of housing accommodations caused by continued high demand, attributable in part to new household formations and decreased supply…”
The Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, §26-501, “Findings and declaration of emergency”: “…that the existing and proposed cuts in federal assistance to housing programs threaten a virtual end to the creation of new housing, thus prolonging the present emergency…”6
The housing emergency is specifically caused by a lack of private residential supply
The Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, §26-501, “Findings and declaration of emergency”: “…such increases were being exacted under stress of prevailing conditions of inflation and of an acute housing shortage resulting from a sharp decline in private residential construction brought about by a combination of local and national factors…”7
The goal of rent regulation is to be a bridge back to a market-based rental system
Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act §2, “Legislative finding”: “…that the transition from regulation to a normal market of free bargaining between landlord and tenant, while still the objective of state policy, must be administered with due regard for such emergency…”
The Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, §26-501, “Findings and declaration of emergency”: “…that the transition from regulation to a normal market of free bargaining between landlord and tenant, while still the objective of state and city policy, must be administered with due regard for such emergency…”
ETPA §2, “Legislative finding”: “…that the transition from regulation to a normal market of free bargaining between landlord and tenant, while the ultimate objective of state policy, must take place with due regard for such emergency…”
Res. No. 256 of 2024, New York City Council (the resolution where the council declared a housing emergency due to a vacancy rate of 5% or below): “…that the transition from regulation to a normal market of free bargaining between landlord and tenant, while still the object of State and City policy, must be administered with due regard for such emergency…” Please take note: this resolution passed the council unanimously, and does so regularly:

Legislative findings point to our policy solutions
The law is repeatedly clear on the causes of New York City’s housing crisis and the goals of rent regulation. But even today in 2025, there are still people who dispute these essential points:
New York City’s housing crisis is fundamentally caused by a lack of supply.
That the supply we most desperately lack is private residential construction.
That the goal of rent regulation is to be a temporary bridge back to a “normal market of free bargaining between landlord and tenant.”
If you do disagree with the points above, you disagree with the state and city legislatures and undermine their stated rationale for rent regulation. I would be interested in hearing from any entrepreneurial lawyers or policymakers who’d want to discuss this point further.
On the flip side, they can really invite unintended consequences if the legislature writes something unnecessary. From section 7.1 of the New York City Council’s Bill Drafting Manual (emphasis added):
“A declaration of legislative intent or purpose, sometimes coupled with legislative findings, sets forth the basis and purpose of legislative action. When drafting a bill for the City, avoid including such a declaration. Instead, reserve information about legislative intent for the committee report or a separate memorandum in support that does not form a part of the legislation. Despite the general caution, a declaration of legislative intent or purpose may be appropriate on rare occasions. In such situations, consult with your supervisor on the best approach and keep in mind that any such declaration must be drafted with care. Courts and others use them to interpret laws, and they can generate litigation and unexpected outcomes if prepared inartfully.”
See Table II in “History of the Board and the Rent Regulation System” in An Introduction to the New York City Rent Guidelines Board and the Rent Stabilization System, p.12.
Per the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (ETPA), a local determination of a housing emergency for all or a class of housing (excluding rent controlled, city/state owned, and others) in NYC can be done when the vacancy rate is 5% or less. From Chapter 576 of 1974 §3(a) (emphasis added):
A declaration of emergency may be made as to any class of housing accommodations if the vacancy rate for the housing accommodations in such class within such municipality is not in excess of five percent and a declaration of emergency may be made as to all housing accommodations if the vacancy rate for the housing accommodations within such municipality is not in excess of five percent.
For an appropriately cutting response to a half-century-old, declared-but-unaddressed emergency, see: “Never Let a Crisis End,” City Journal (November 2024).
The legislative findings sections were written at various points in time. They say more than what I excerpt here, and I’ve linked directly to the law so you can read them for yourselves. But they do not vary in my essential points.
While this finding correctly identifies a lack of new housing supply, it overlooks its own role in preventing it. This includes, but it not nearly limited to, the massive citywide downzoning that occurred with the 1961 zoning resolution.
While this finding correctly identifies a lack of new housing supply, the city council overlooks the city’s own role in preventing it. The mentioned “local factors” are primarily self-inflicted. This includes, but it not nearly limited to, the massive citywide downzoning that occurred with the 1961 zoning resolution.